Based on an analysis of the second National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, conducted between 1976 and 1980, we find that the frequency of the consumption of beer, the most popular alcoholic beverage among youths, is inversely related to the real price of beer and to the minimum legal age for its purchase and consumption. The negative price and legal drinking age effects are by no means limited to reductions In the fraction of youths who consume beer infrequently (less than once a week).
EFFECTS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE PRICES AND LEGAL DRINKING AGES ON YOUTH ALCOHOL USE Douglas Coate and Michael Grossman* I. Introduction and Background
Since the mid 197Os, the Federal government of the United States and various state and local governments have been involved in a campaign to reduce deaths from motor vehicle accidents by discouraging alcohol abuse.
One major element of this campaign has been the upward trend in state minimum legal ages for the purchase and consumption of alcoholic beverages that began with the increase in the legal drinking age in Minnesota from 18 to 19 years of age in 1976. An additional 27 states had increased legal drinking ages by the time of the Federal Uniform Drinking Act of July 1984.
This legislation allows the Federal government, through its control of Federal highway funds, to intercede in a legislative area traditionally reserved for states. Five percent of a statets Federal highway construction fund allocation for the fiscal year 1987 will be withheld if the minimum legal drinking age is below 21 years on October 1, 1986, and 10 percent will be withheld from the 1988 fiscal year allocation if its drinking age is below 21 on October 1, 1987. To date, 14 states have passed laws complying with the act, and a total of 37 states now have a minimum drinking age of 21.1 A second major element of the antidrinking campaign is reflected by more severe penalties for conviction of drunken driving, the allocation of additional resources to apprehend drunk drivers, and an easing in the standards required for conviction.
One policy that has been virtually ignored by the Federal and state governments in the antidrinking campaign is increased taxation of alcoholic beverages which, by raising prices, would lower alcoholic beverage consumption. Instead, the Federal excise tax rates on liquor (distilled spirits), beer, and wine remained constant in nominal terms between November 1, 1951 and the end of fiscal 1985. During this period the Federal government taxed liquor at the rate of $10.50 per proof gallon (one gallon of 100 proof liquor, which is the equivalent of 50 percent alcohol by volume), beer at the rate of $.29 per gallon (approximately 4.5 percent alcohol by volume), and wine at the rate of $.17 per gallon (between 11.6 percent and 21 percent alcohol by volume).2
Partly as a result of the stability of the Federal excise taxes and the modest increases In state and local excise taxes, the real price of alcoholic beverages (the nominal price divided by the Consumer Price Index) has declined substantially over time. Between 1960 and , the real price of liquor fell by 48 percent; the real price of beer fell by 27 percent; and the real price of wine fell by 20 percent (Cook 1981) . While 29 states raised the legal drinking age from 1976 through 1984, real alcoholic beverage prices continued to fall: 27 percent for liquor, 12 percent for beer, and 19 percent for wine (Bureau of Labor Statistics various years).
Thus, as argued by Cook and Tauchen (1982) , If alcohol abuse is sensitive to price, a government policy of declining real excise tax levels actually may be exacerbating this problem.
A primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the sensitivity of alcoholic beverage consumption, particularly excessive consumption, to price among 16 through 21 year olds in the U.S. Thus, we provide evidence -3-for this important age group on the extent to which declining real alcoholic beverage excise taxes have contributed to increases In youth drinking and on the extent to which increases in real alcoholic beverage excise taxes can serve as a potent instrument In the antidrinking campaign. We also examine the effect of an increase In the legal drinking age on youth alcohol use. Our empirical research Is based on the second National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES II), conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) between February 1976 and February 1980 . It capitalizes on substantial differences in legal drinking ages among states in the period of NHANES II and on substantial differences in the prices of alcoholic beverages among states due primarily to differences
In state excise tax rates on these beverages.
We focus on teenagers and young adults in the context of the antidrinking campaign because motor vehicle accident mortality is the leading cause of death of persons under the age of 35, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1983) estimates that alcohol is Involved In over half of these fatal accidents. In 1979 persons under the age of 25 accounted for 22 percent of all licensed drivers but 38 percent of all drivers involved in fatal accidents (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1983). These figures are even more dramatic than they appear because members of the young driver group do not drive nearly as much as older drivers (Voas and Moulden 1980) . We also focus on youths because alcohol abuse in adolescence appears to be associated with alcohol abuse in adult life (for example, Blane and Hewitt 1977; Rachal et al. 1980 ). Thus, policies to prevent the onset of this behavior by adolescents might be the most effective means to reduce it in all segments of the population.
Research on the responsiveness of youth alcohol use to alcoholic beverage prices is particularly timely in light of proposals to correct the erosion in the real value of the Federal excise tax rates on all forms of alcoholic beverages since 1951 and to prevent future erosion by indexing tax rates to the rate of inflation or by converting to an ad valorem alcoholic beverage excise tax system (for example, Moore and Gerstein 1981; Luks 1983; Cook 1984; Harris 1984; Becker 1985; Jacobson and Albion 3 1985) .
Moreover, although beer is the drink of choice among youths who drink alcoholic beverages (see Section II), the alcohol in liquor is taxed three times as heavily as the alcohol in beer. This has led to suggestions to equalize the tax rates on the alcohol in all forms of alcoholic beverages by raising the tax on beer (for example, Harris 1984; Jacobson and Albion 1985) . Research on the sensitivity of youth alcohol use to legal drinking ages is also valuable given the adverse reaction to Federal uniform drinking legislation,5 its scheduled expiration at the end of fiscal 1988, and volatility in state minimum drinking ages in the 1970s and 1980s.
Aside from our study with Arluck (Grossman, Coate, and Arluck forthcoming) described below, there Is no research on the price sensitivity of youth alcohol use and no investigations of the long-run impacts of differences in legal drinking ages in recent nationally representative samples. Statistically significant short-run increases in alcohol consumption by youths have been reported in selected states or provinces of Canada that lowered their legal drinking age in the early 1970s, and significant short-run reductions in consumption have been reported in selected states that raised their legal drinking age in the late 1970s or early 1980s (for example, Smart and Goodstadt 1977; Wagenaar 1983; Williams and Lillis 1985) .6 Grossman, Coate, and Arluck (forthcoming) find that the incidence of heavy drinking and frequent drinking by youths falls as alcoholic beverage prices or legal drinking ages rise. These results are based on the first National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES I), conducted by NCHS between May 1971 and June 1974, and pertain to youths ages 16 through 21 who reside in large metropolitan areas.
Studies that use time series or state cross sections to estimate price elasticities of alcoholic beverages (for example Ornstein 1980; Ornstein and Hanssens 1985) employ per capita consumption by all age groups as the dependent variable. Therefore, the estimated price elasticities primarily reflect adult drinking behavior and cannot be used to predict how youths would respond to excise tax and price changes. As pointed Out above, however, it is especially important to focus on youths in the context of the antidrinking campaign.
It should be noted that, even if adult price elasticities are relatively small (inelastic) in absolute value, this need not be the case for youth price elasticities. Given the habitual nature of alcohol abuse, adult users, who almost always will have been users for longer periods of time than youths, may be much less sensitive to price than youths. In addition, the fraction of his disposable income that a youthful drinker spends on alcohol probably exceeds the corresponding fraction of an adult drinker. It is well known that the uncompensated (money income-constant) price elasticity of a good rises as the fraction of income spent on that good rises. Finally, bandwagon or peer effects are much more important in the case of youth drinking than in the case of adult drinking. That is, youths are more likely to drink if their peers also drink (for example Blane and Hewitt 1977; Rachal et al. 1980) . As shown by Leibenstein (1950) and by Lewit, Coate, and Grossman (1981) , the presence of bandwagon or peer effects increases the price elasticity of demand.7 II. Methodology
A. Data and Subsample Selection
To examine the effects of alcohol prices and legal drinking ages on youth alcohol use, we use the second National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES II) to estimate demand functions for alcohol consumption by youths. NHANES II Is a national probability sample of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population of the U.S., with some oversampling of low-income persons, preschool children, and the elderly. The survey was conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) between February 1976 and February 1980 and contains approximately 21,000 persons between the ages of 6 months and 74 years. These persons were selected from 64 primary sampling units, which consist of one or more counties. Each person In the survey was given a detailed physical examination.
A variety of information on medical and health histories, family socioeconomic characteristics, and diet patterns also was obtained. Data on alcohol use for the past three months were collected for persons ages 12 through 74. These data were acquired on the date on which the physical examination was given as one component of a food frequency interview.8
We have limited our demand function estimates to 16 through 21 year olds because of our Interest In the sensitivity of alcohol consumption of older -7-youth to price and to legal drinking age. Youths below the age of 16 are excluded from the demand functions because they cannot drive legally in most states. Youths ages 16 and 17 are illegal drinkers in all states, but they are included in the demand functions because it is likely to be easier (less costly) for them to obtain alcoholic beverages in a state with a legal drinking age of 18 than in one with a higher legal drinking age (Cook and Tauchen 1984) . Twenty-one year olds are legal drinkers in all states, The beverage-specific number of drinking occasions in the past three months is a categorical variable in NHANES II, and the four categories shown in Table 1 (4-7 times a week, 1-3 times a week, less than once a week, and never) are employed as outcome measures In demand functions estimated by multivariate techniques described in Section II.D.'° Here it is important to note that the use of a categorical variable allows us to examine the determinants of beverage-specific drinking participation and infrequent, fairly frequent, and frequent participation simultaneously. It also permits the impacts of prices and legal drinking ages on these outcomes to differ. In addition, if more alcohol is consumed per drinking occasion as the number of occasions rises, true consumption would not be linearly related to a continuous drinking frequency measure. To take account of this nonlinearity, a categorical variable would be preferable to a continuous one even if the latter were available.
The number of drinking occasions per week is closely related to, and in a majority of cases probably coincides with, the number of drinking days The validity of the NHANES II alcohol measures is underscored by referring to the related problem of the measurement of cigarette smoking by adolescents. Williams and Giles (1984) have reviewed the literature on self-reported smoking behavior of adolescents and have concluded "...that teenagers probably do report 'truthfully' about their smoking behavior when anonymous questionnaires are used (p.297).
An additional consideration is that the drinking questions were included as a small part of a much larger survey that was focused on very different issues. Gordon and Kannel (1983) argue that this improves the quality of reports of alcohol consumption.
To be sure, it Is possible that heavy consumers of alcoholic beverages are more likely to underreport their consumption than other persons (Midanik 1982; Pouch 1982) . If heavy users are more likely to be found in areas with low prices or low legal drinking ages, estimates of the demand parameters of these variables are biased toward zero. This is another reason for the use of a categorical rather than a continuous drinking measure. In particular, the former does not assume a linear relationship between true and reported consumption. Moreover, youths are unlikely to be found in one of the four outcome categories used here rather than another due to reporting error.
C. Measurement of Independent Variables
Panel B of Table 1 Table 2 . These results should, however, be interpreted with caution because the price of beer or liquor is specific to the state rather than to the primary sampling unit. Given errors of measurement in price and correlations between true price and the religion variables, price coefficients are biased toward zero and religion coefficients are biased away from zero. Therefore, we wish to reemphasize that price effects are not necessarily overstated in absolute value when drinking sentiment is excluded from the demand functions.
The religion variables pertain to 1980 and were taken from a survey conducted by the National Council of the Churches of Christ and the Glenmary Research Center (see Quinn et al. 1982) . Jews are included with 
D. Estimation Techniques
The beverage-specific frequency of drinking in the past three months consists of four outcome categories (see Table 1 ). Therefore, multinomial logit equations are fitted by the method of maxImum likelihood. In the case of beer, let w1, I2' 11j3, and if14 be the probabilities that the 1th youth consumes beer 4-7 times a week, 1-3 times a week, less than once a week and never, respectively. The probability of the kth outcome
where x is the value of the tth independent variable for the 1th youth.
The logarithm of the odds of category k relative to category 4 Is ln(jk/j4) = ak + ktXit
The logit coefficient kt shows the percentage change in the odds of category I relative to no beer participation for a one unit change in xj. The marginal effect of x1
Wik is
Multinomial logit estimation methods are discussed in detail by Maddala This is because that model does not allow for nonlinear and possibly nonmonotonic effects of the independent variables on the outcomes at issue.
Since the beer frequency equation, for example, contains non-beer drinkers (the omitted category), it gives an estimate of the effect of each independent variable on the probability of no beer participation.20 We do not model beer consumption as a two-stage process In which youths first determine whether they will drink beer and then determine the frequency of beer consumption given participation. In the two-stage model non-beer participants would be excluded from the equation for frequency. We do not use this model because it is appropriate only when the determinants of participation differ from those of frequency (McFadden 1973) . This condition 21
is not satisfied in our research. Table 2 contains maximum likelihood estimates of multinomial logit beer Chi-square 464.18 aLogit coefficients and asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses are shown. The critical asymptotic t-ratios at the 5 percent level are 1.64 for a onetailed test and 1.96 for a two-tailed test. The chi-square associated with each equation is significant at the 1 percent level. Each equation includes three intercepts and the following additional independent variables: age of youth in months, race of youth, sex of youth, and real family income. Recall from Section III.C that the price and legal drinking age coefficients are likely to be conservative lower-bound estimates of the true parameters with the religion variables Included In the demand equations.
III. Results
Also, the corresponding coefficients obtained without controlling for religion are not necessarily upper-bound estimates of the true parameters. In -21 -light of these considerations, the findings that the real beer price coefficients retain their signs and relative rankings and the beer legal drinking age coefficients retain their signs, rankings, and statistical significance are impressive and important.
Fewer negative and significant price and legal drinking age effects emerge from the demand functions for liquor (not shown) than from the demand functions for beer. Moreover, the negative liquor price elasticities are smaller in absolute value than the corresponding beer price elasticities. For these reasons and because beer is the most popular alcoholic beverage among youths, we focus on the frequency of beer consumption in the remainder of this paper.
In logit equations not shown, the real price of liquor was included in the demand functions for beer. No evidence of substitution between beer and liquor was revealed by these equations. In most cases the cross price effect was negative (suggesting complementarity) but not significant. This finding is probably not an artifact of multicollinearity; the simple correlation coefficient between the price of beer and liquor is positive but not substantial (r.19).
To evaluate the potential impacts of the Federal excise tax and legal drinking age policy initiatives discussed in Section I, we simulate their effects on the frequency of beer consumption by youths. Specifically, first we compute the "actual" percentage distribution of the frequency of beer consumption (4-7 times a week, 1-3 times a week, less than once a week, and never) by predicting the four outcome probabilities Although the price of beer rises relative to the price of liquor, our demand function estimates suggest that youths would not substitute liquor for beer. Thus, cross price effects are assumed to be zero in the simulations. Table 3 contains the results of the simulations. Two simulations of each policy are presented. The first is based on the beer demand function that excludes the religion variables, while the second is based on the beer demand function that includes the religion variables.
According to Panels A and B of Table 3 , the number of youths who drink Under the combined tax policy, the incidence of excessive drinking falls dramatically (see Panels G and H). To be specific, the number of youths who drink beer 4-7 times a week, 1-3 times a week, and less than once a week fall by 32 percent, 24 percent, and 8 percent, respectively.26
Simultaneously, the number of youths who do not drink beer rises by 28 percent.
Although the combined tax policy has somewhat larger effects on the rates of frequent and fairly frequent beer consumption than the drinking age policy, it probably is more notable that both policies have sizable negative impacts on these measures of beer consumption. Put differently, the negative responses are not limited to the probability of infrequent drinking. Indeed, that probability rises under the drinking age policy.
It falls under the tax policy but by a smaller percentage amount than the other two probabilities. Even the absolute reduction in the infrequent drinking rate (1 percentage point on average) is smaller than the absolute reductions in the fairly frequent and frequent rates (7 percentage points and 4 percentage points, respectively).
To summarize, our results suggest that the frequency of the consumption of beer, the most popular alcoholic beverage among youths, is inversely related to the real price of beer and to the minimum legal age for its purchase and consumption. The negative price and legal drinking age effects are by no means limited to reductions in the fraction of youths who consume beer infrequently (less than once a week). Instead, the fractions of youths who consume beer fairly frequently (1-3 times a week) and frequently (4-7 times a week) fall more in absolute or percentage terms than the fraction of infrequent drinkers when price or the drinking age rises.
These are striking findings because frequent and fairly frequent drinkers are likely to be responsible for a large percentage of youth motor vehicle accidents and deaths.
With regard to the magnitudes of the effects at issue, a Federal policy that simultaneously taxes the alcohol in beer and liquor at the same rates and abuse are desired, both a uniform drinking age of 21 and an increase in the Federal excise tax rate on beer are effective policies to accomplish this goal.27 They also suggest that the tax policy may be more potent than the drinking age policy.
It does not follow that we have provided enough evidence to justify the approximately eight fold (thirteen fold based on the 1984 CPI) increase in the Federal excise tax on beer that serves as the basis of the above computations. Excise tax hikes impose welfare costs on all segments of the population, while a drinking age policy is targeted at the group in the population that accounts for a disproportionate share of motor vehicle accidents and deaths. On the other hand, the enforcement and administrative costs associated with a uniform minimum drinking age of 21 may exceed -28 -those associated with the tax policy. Moreover, an excise tax increase may reduce excessive alcohol consumption by adults as well as by youths.
Finally, Becker (1968) has shown that the optimal way for a society to deter offenses is via a system of monetary fines. Of course, youthful drunken drivers may respond to an increase in the fine for this offense only if the probabilities of apprehension and conviction are nontrivial.
If substantial resources must be allocated to raising these probabilities, the excise tax policy may be preferable to or complementary with a system of large fines. In conclusion more research is required to formulate the best mix of policies to deal with youth alcohol abuse. Our study represents a useful first step in this process. 71n a penetrating economic analysis of rational addiction over the life cycle, Becker and Murphy (1985) show that the impact of habit formation or peer pressure on price responsiveness depends upon whether the price variation is permanent or temporary, whether the magnitude of the effect is measured by the slope or the elasticity, and whether the outcome pertains to the probability of consuming the addictive good or to consumption given participation. In certain cases adults can be more responsive to price than youths in their model, while in other cases the reverse holds.
II is described in detail by NCHS (1981 '4Since the youth's age is included as an independent variable, the specification employed here is equivalent to one in which alcohol use (y) depends on the youth's age (a), the difference between the legal drinking age and age (x1 = d -a), and a vector of additional variables (x2)
Substitute the definition of x1 Into the above equation to obtain y = a0 + (a1
Note that the coefficient of x1 in the first equation is Identical to the coefficient of d in the second equation. we interpret the estimated price effects as uncompensated (money incomeconstant) rather than compensated (utility-constant) substitution effects.
One consideration is that family income may be a very Imperfect measure of a youth's command of real resources. A second consideration is that the CPI measures the cost of living of a 4-persoa family. Expenditure patterns 21An estimation issue in addition to those discussed above arises because NHANES II is a stratified cluster sample rather than a simple random sample. Consider an ordinary least squares regression in this context. If the regression is fit under the assumption of simple random sampling, regression coefficients are unbiased, but their t-ratios are overstated (Holt 1977) . A computer program called SURREGR, described by Holt (1977) , estimates unbiased t-ratios for ordinary least squares regressions --ratios that account for sample design effects. There is, however, no SURREGR equivalent of a logit model. This suggests that the asymptotic tratios (the ratios of logit coefficients to their standard errors) shown in Section III may be biased upward. There is, however, a factor that goes in the opposite direction. We employ a relatively sparse set of regressors;
standard errors would fall if this set were expanded. Recall that Arluck (in progress) finds that the coefficients of interest in the demand functions are not sensitive to the inclusion of additional independent variables.
22The ratios of logit coefficients to their standard errors do not have Student's t distribution. These ratios do, however, have an asymptotic normal distribution. Therefore, the t test is an asymptotic one.
23Statements concerning statistical significance in the text are based on one-tailed tests except when the direction of the effect is unclear on a priori grounds or when the estimated effect has the "wrong sign." In the latter cases two-tailed tests are used. In particular, the own price and legal drinking effects are expected to be negative, and the border legal age effects are expected to be positive. When no significance level is Indicated, it Is assumed to be 5 percent for a one-tailed test.
24Based on equation (13) effects. This is preferable to computing marginal price or legal drinking age effects at the point of means or for each individual and then multiplying by the change in the policy variable at issue. Note that the actual percentage distribution of the frequency beer consumption in Table 3 differs from the corresponding "observed" distribution in Table 1 . The latter contains, for example, the mean of a dichotomous variable that equals one if a youth is a frequent beer drinker. These differences emerge because a multinomial logit equation, unlike a multiple regression, does not necessarily pass through the point of means of the sample. But they are very small. In particular, the difference between an outcome probability in Table 1 and the corresponding probability in Table 3 is always less than 1 percentage point in absolute value.
26Although the elasticity of the probability of infrequent beer consumption with respect to the real price of beer is positive, the probability of infrequent beer drinking falls as the excise tax rises. This is because the probability of infrequent drinking is not a monotonically increasing function of price [see equation (3)].
27Some caution should be exercised in applying the results of the drinking age simulation to the Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act because the mean legal drinking age was closer to 20 in July 1984 than to the NHANES II mean of 19. On the other hand, as pointed out in Section I, a long-term prohibition of purchases of alcoholic beverages by persons below the age of 
